In this paper a new model of multichoice games with a coalition structure is proposed, which can be seen as an extension of the Owen coalition structure. A coalitional value on the given model is defined, which can be seen as an extension of the Owen value. Three axiomatic systems are studied. The first one is enlightened by Owen's characterization for the Owen value and Faigle and Kern's characterization for the Shapley value on games under precedence constraints. The second one is inspired by Bilbao's characterization for the Shapley value on games on convex geometries. The last one is an extension of Young's characterization for the Shapley value on traditional games. Furthermore, the relationship between the given coalitional value and the core of multichoice games with a coalition structure is discussed.
Introduction
A multichoice game is a generalization of a traditional TU game in which each player has several activity levels. The reward that a group of players can obtain depends on the efforts of the cooperating players. Hsiao and Raghavan [1] introduced multichoice games in which players have the same number of activity levels, and with each level of activity a weight is associated in order to discriminate between those levels. van den Nouweland et al. [2] considered a more general case with different numbers of activity levels, and extended the notions of core, dominant core and Weber set. They also proposed an alternative extension for the Shapley value based on an extension of the probabilistic formula by orders, but they did not give additional support for this extension. Calvo and Santos [3] studied another value for multichoice games, which is focused on total payoff instead of payoff per level. Klijn et al. [4] have studied a new solution to multichoice games, which is based on the work of Derks and Peters [5] . Calvo and Santos [6] researched a value for multichoice games by restricting the Aumann-Shapley value for continuum games in framework of multichoice games. Peters and Zank [7] proposed the egalitarian solution for multichoice games with each player having the same number of activity levels, which is an extension of the egalitarian solution proposed by Dutta and Ray [8] for traditional games. Recently, Hwang and Liao [9] investigated the weighted associated consistent value, and characterized it by means of the weighted balanced contributions and the associated consistency. More researches can be seen in [4, 6, 9, 10] .
As we know, in some cooperative games, such as Economic Community and Military Alliance, the players are joined in coalitions that form a partition or coalitional structure of the set of players. Aumann and Drze [11] first researched in this area and proposed a model of games with a coalition structure, where the players in a union are independent to other players. Different to Aumann and Drze [11] , Owen [12] gave another model for games with a coalition structure, where the probability of cooperation among coalitions is considered, and provided the Owen value, which is an extension of the Shapley value. Later, many experts and scholars have studied deeply [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19] .
All above researches are about multichoice games and traditional games with a coalition structure. Both contexts, TU games with a priori system of unions and multichoice games are unified by Albizuri [20] who introduced the concept of a coalition structure for multichoice games and defined a multichoice coalition value in this framework. This value is an extension of the Shapley value [21] for traditional games. Based on the coalition structure introduced by Albizuri [20] , Jones and Wilson [22] defined another coalitional value in a similar way as the Owen value. Based on the building axiomatic system, the authors showed its existence and uniqueness. From the analysis [22] , it shows that the calculation of the introduced coalitional value is complex in the setting of the given model [20] when each player has several participation levels. Further, the coalitional value gives the same weight with respect to the different participation levels. In this paper we introduce another coalition structure for multichoice games, which is an extension of the coalition structure proposed by Owen [12] . According to the works of van den Nouweland et al. [2] and Owen [12] , a coalitional value for multichoice games with a coalition structure is proposed, and three axiomatic systems for the given coalitional value are discussed, by which its existence and uniqueness can be proved. When multichoice games are convex, the relationship between the introduced coalitional value and the core is examined, which coincides with the classical case.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, some basic concepts and notions for multichoice games are briefly reviewed. In Section 3, the model of multichoice games with a coalition structure is presented, and a coalitional value is defined. In Section 4, three axiomatic systems for the given coalitional value are discussed. In Section 5, the relationship between the given coalitional value and the core of multichoice games with a coalition structure is examined. The conclusion is made in the last section.
Preliminaries
Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} be a set of players, and suppose each player i ∈ N has m i + 1 activity levels at which he can play. We set M i = {0, 1, ..., m i } as the action space of player i ∈ N, where the action 0 means no participating, and M
the worth that the players can obtain when each player i plays at level s i ∈ M i . Let m = (m 1 , m 2 , ..., m n ), and a multichoice game be denoted by a triple (N, m, v), if there is not confusion we will simply denote a multichoice game (N, m, v) by v. The set of all multichoice games with the player set N is denoted by MC N . For all coalitions s,t ∈ M, let s ∧ t = (s i ∧ t i ) i∈N and s ∨ t = (s i ∨ t i ) i∈N . Furthermore, we denote s ≤ t for all s,t ∈ M if and only if s i ≤ t i for each i ∈ N. For any s = (s 1 , ..., s n ) ∈ M, let S = {i ∈ N|s i > 0}. e S denotes the vector in N satisfying e S i = 1 for i ∈ S, otherwise, e S i = 0, where S ⊆ N. Especially, e / 0 denotes the vector in N satisfying e S i = 0 for all i ∈ N.
van den Nouweland et al. [2] gave a value for multichoice games as follows:
where σ is an admissible order for v, v σ means the value of v with respect to the admissible order σ . It is not difficult to know that Eq. (1) is equivalent to the following equation.
where
, and
is the number of admissible orders from coalition e / 0 to coalition s, where s i is the last step, and
is the number of admissible orders from coalition s to coalition m.
A coalitional value for multichoice games with a coalition structure
A coalition structure on (N, m, v), given by Albizuri [20] , is a family B = {B 1 , ..., B w } of coalitions on M such that
, where x k i denotes the activity level of the player i in coalition B k . The author further supposed that the same players do not form two coalitions with different activity levels. However, the author does not give the explanation for this restriction. Based on the coalition structure introduced by Albizuri [20] , Jones and Wilson [22] introduced the following coalitional value, for any i ∈ N, expressed by
where |S|, |W |, |R| and |B k | respectively denote the cardinalities of S, W , R and B k , W = {1, 2, ..., w},
It is easy to see that the coalitional value degenerates to be the Owen value when each player has only two participation levels 0 and 1. From Eq.(3), we know it is focused on total payoff instead of payoff per level. Since the weights given by Eq.(3) only consider the number of active players, it gives the same weight with respect to the different participation levels.
From the coalition structure [20] , we know the author considers the player participation levels satisfy addtitivity, e.g., let M + i = {1, 2}, then the player i's participation level 2 is equal to the sum of his two participation levels 1. This point seems to be unreasonable in some situations. In above example, if these two participation levels of the player i respectively denote a number of money, and the participation levels 1 and 2 respectively denote one million dollars and five million dollars. It is obvious that the participation level 2 is not equal to the sum of two participation levels 1. In the setting of Albizuri's model, the total money of the player i used for cooperation is two million dollars rather than five million dollars.
Different to the coalition structure given by Albizuri [20] , we introduce another coalition structure on multichoice games. Owen [12] gave a coalition structure for traditional games as follows: Definition 3.1. [12] Γ = {B 1 , B 2 , ..., B h } is said to be a coalition structure on player set N, if it satisfies
Here, we apply the coalition structure introduced by Owen [12] in the framework of multichoice games. For 
Definition 3.3 is an extension of the carrier proposed by Shapley [21] , and Definition 3.4 is an extension of the quotient game introduced by Owen [12] .
Let (N, m, v,Γ ) be a multichoice game with the coalition structure Γ , and MC CN be the set of all multichoice games with a coalition structure. Following the works of van den Nouweland et al. [2] and Owen [12] , we introduce a coalitional value on MC CN as follows:
where p and r respectively denote the cardinalities of P and R , and
with
Obviously, Eq. (4) degenerates to be the Owen value [12] when v is restricted in the setting of games with a coalition structure, namely, every player has only two activity levels 0 and 1. Furthermore, Eq. (4) degenerates to be the Shapley value for multichoice games [2] when h is equal to 1, namely, there is only one coalition in Γ , that is N. In other words, Eq.(4) can be seen as an extension both of them.
As we know, when a coalition structure for traditional games has n coalitions, the Owen value degenerates to be the Shapley value for traditional games. But this point does not hold any more when it turns to multichoice games. Namely, when a coalition structure Γ for a multichoice game has n coalitions, it can not guarantee the given coalitional value is equal to the Shapley value introduced by van den Nouweland et al. [2] . Example 3.3. Let N = {1, 2}, m = (2, 2) and Γ = {B 1 , B 2 }, where B 1 = {1} and B 2 = {2}. If the values for coalitions are given as follows: 
Characterizations of the given coalitional value
In this section, we mainly discuss the axiomatic systems of the given coalitional value. Let ϕ be a coalitional value on MC CN .
The analogue of unanimity games for multichoice games are minimal effort games (N, m, u s ) ∈ MC N , for any s ∈ M\{e / 0 }, defined by
for all t ∈ M\{e / 0 }. The identity games for multichoice games are games
for all t ∈ M\{e / 0 }. According to the literature [12, 23] , we give the following properties for the coalitional value ϕ.
Remark 4.1. The properties ADD, EFF, NP and SQ degenerate to be the properties introduced by Owen [12] when we restrict the domain of CM CN in the setting of traditional games with a coalition structure. Furthermore, the property HST degenerates to be the property proposed by Faigle and Kern [23] (N, m, v,Γ ) = ψ i j (N, m, v,Γ 
From above, it shows EFF holds. From Eq.(4) and the conditions in HST, it gets
c 2014 NSP Natural Sciences Publishing Cor.
and p ′ is the cardinality of
Now one can easily verify that ψ indeed satisfies the property of HST.
From the proof of EFF, it has 
On the other hand, from Eq.(4) it gets carrier (C). If t ∈ M is a carrier for the multichoice game v ∈ MC CN , then
When we restrict the domain of MC CN in the setting of traditional games, the property C degenerates to be the property proposed by Shapley [21] . Bilbao [24] gave a characterization of the Shapley value for games on convex geometries by using chain axiom. Here, we define it in the setting of multichoice games with a coalition structure and give the following property. chain axiom (CA). Let v ∈ MC CN . For all B k ∈ Γ and all i, j ∈ B k with s i ∈ M 
p ′ is the cardinality of P ′ = {l ∈ P| b l ∧ s = e / 0 }. It is obviously that the chain axiom on MC CN degenerates to be the property introduced by Bilbao [24] when we restrict the domain of MC CN in the setting of traditional games on convex geometries. 
where γ=
Thus,
From above, it shows
Uniqueness. Let ϕ be a coalitional value on MC CN , and satisfy the above mentioned properties. For any v ∈ MC CN , there exists an unique set of coefficients
From L, we only need to prove ϕ and ψ coincides on (N, m, δ t ,Γ ) for any t ∈ Fe(N, m,Γ ). Similar to Theorem 4.1, for any s ∈ Fe(N, m,Γ ), let P ′ = {l ∈ P|b l ∧ s = e / 0 } and B ′ l = B l ∩ S. Define quotient game (P, u B s ) as follows:
From CA, it gets
From above, we know
By Eq. (6), it has
and
When ∑ i∈S∩B k s i = ∑ i∈B k (b k ) i , by Eqs. (6) and (7), it gets
By Eqs. (6) and (8), it gets
From induction and t i = s i , it gets
On the other hand, by Eq.(4) it has
Namely, ϕ and ψ coincides on (N, m, δ T ,Γ ). The proof is finished. Remark 4.3. From Theorem 4.2, we know Eq. (4) is the unique coalitional value on MC CN that satisfies ADD, C, CA and SQ, as well as the unique coalitional value on MC CN that satisfies L, C, CA and SQ.
Young [25] proposed a characterization of the Shapley value by using strongly monotonicity. According to the literature [25] , we propose strongly monotonicity on MC CN as follows:
for all s ∈ Fe(N, m,Γ ) with s i = 0 and j ∈ M
Similar to the property of symmetry given by Shapley [21] and the property of symmetric in the unions introduced by Owen [12] , we introduce the veto property on MC CN as follows:
where t ∈ Fe(N, m,Γ ) is a veto coalition, and T = {i ∈ N|t i = 0}. Here, t ∈ Fe(N, m,Γ ) is said to be a veto coalition if it satisfies 
where y = ∨ w∈R b w , and p t is the cardinality of P t . For the same reason, it has
Now one easily verifies that ψ indeed satisfies the property of VP. We now prove the uniqueness part. Form SMON, it gets if 
where t is an analogue of unanimity game as given above. By Eq.(4), it gets
for any B k ∈ Γ , where p t is the cardinality of P t = {l ∈ P|t ∧ b l = 0}. Define the index I of v to be the minimum number of nonzero terms in some expression for v of form (10) . As in 
where i ∈ B k ∈ Γ . Therefore ψ = ϕ, whenever the index of v is 0 or 1. Assume now that ψ = ϕ, whenever the index of v is at most I, and let v have index I + 1 with expression
where α t r = 0, t r ∈ Fe(N, m,Γ ) and p t r is the cardinality of P t r = {l ∈ P|t r ∧ b l = 0} for all r = 1, 2, ..., I + 1. Let t = ∧ 
For any i ∈ T with (t r ) i = t i = j ∈ M + i and all r = 1, 2, ..., I + 1, t r is a veto coalition for α t r u t r , where r = 1, 2, ..., I + 1. From EFF, VP and SQ, it gets
Remark 4.4. As Young [25] pointed, strongly monotonicity can be replaced by independence condition, namely, a player's value depends only on the vector of his marginal contributions. Khmelnitskaya and Yanovskaya [18] 
When we restrict the multichoice game (N, m, v) in the setting of traditional games, Definition 5.1 reduces to be the concept of convexity for traditional case. Similar to the definition of the core of games with a coalition structure, we define the core of multichoice games with a Namely,
where S = {k|s k = 0, k ∈ N}. Thus,
Repeat the above process ∑ i∈N m i − ∑ i∈N s i times, it has Table 1 . 
Conclusion
We have introduced and researched a coalitional value for multichoice games with a coalition structure, which can be regarded as an extension of the Owen value [12] and the Shapley value [2] . Furthermore, we discuss three characterizations of the given coalitional value, which will help us better understand it. Like other solutions, we can have other axiomatic systems to define the given coalitional value. The introduced model for multichoice games is different to any existing one. Because of the advantages of the value proposed by van den Nouweland et al. [2] , the given coalitional value considers the player participation levels, and endows the different weights with respect to the different participation levels. However, we mainly study one coalitional value for multichoice games with a coalition strucutre, and it will be interesting to discuss other payoff indices. Furthermore, we shall study the payoff indices of multichoice games under precedence constraints by using graph theory [27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32] .
